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IN  THE  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC
Do private  school.  students  learn  more than  their  public  school
counterpurts?  Is it  more  or less  expensive  to  educate  students  in  private
schools? The answers  to these  questions  were addressed  initially  in the
United  States,  where  a debate  was sparked  by the  Coleman,  Hoffer  and  Kilgore
(1982)  report,  which  concluded  that  private  (Catholic)  schools  were  more
effective  than  public  schools  in  helping  students  acquire  cognitive  skills.
Recently  the  issue  has  been  addressed  in  the  international  setting,  with  the
evidence  for  other  countries  summarized  in  a  paper  by Jimenez,  Lockheed  and
Paqueo  (1989).
The  debate  over  the  above  questions  is  fueled  by controversies  over
methodology,  interpretatiu&.  And  data. The  most important  methodolog,ical  issue
is the  difficulty  of  attributing  the  differences  in the  cognitive  abilities  of
students  in  public  versus  private  schools  to  school  inputs  alone,  since  a
variety  of non-school  factors  such  as socioeconomic  background,  innate  ability
and  individual  motivation  also  affect  achievement.  These  non-school  factors
also  affect  school  choice.  by families. For  example,  were  children  from
privileged  backgrounds  to attend  only  private  schools,  it  would  be hard to
infer  how they  would  do in  public  schools. Thus,  unless  non-school  factors
are  controlled  for  appropriately,  estimates  of  school  effects  will  be
contaminated  by what  has  become  known  as "selectivity  bias."- 2 -
This  paper  contributes  to the  literature  in four  important  ways.
First,  it  addresses  the  difficult  methodological  questions  that  have  arisen  in
other  studies. Enrollment  in  a  public  or private  school  is  a choice  made  by
the  students  and  parents. If this  choice  is systematically  correlated  with
personal  characteristics,  there  may  be sample  selection  bias.  In this  study
we use some  recent  methodological  advances  to  model  and  correct  statistically
for  this  bias.  Second,  the  paper  extends  the  empirical  evidence  for
developing  countries  by analyzing  data  from  a  survey,  modeled  after  the
International  Association  for  the  Evaluation  of Educational  Achievement  (IEA)
Second  Mathematics  Study,  carried  out  in  the  Dominican  Republic  (Luna  and
Gonzalez  1986). Third,  we differentiate  between  two  types  of private  schcols,
which  we compare  with  urban  public  schools. In  contrast,  most  earlier  studies
failed  to distinguish  different  types  of  private  schools. In some  cases,  they
treated  all  private  schools  similarly,  while  in  other  cases  they  examined  only
particular  types  of  private  schools,  for  example,  Catholic  ones (Bryk  and  Lee
1988). Fourth,  we use  independently  gathered  data  to  compare  the  unit  costs
of public  and  private  schools  before  reaching  conclusions  regarding  the
relative  efficiency  (as  opposed  to the  relative  productivity)  of  public  and
private  schools.
The  next  section  of this  paper  outlines  the  basic  conceptual  model.
It is  followed  by sections  on the  data,  school  effects,  relative  costs,  and
conclusions.THE BASIC  CONCEPTUAL  MODEL
Would  a secondary  school  student,  randomly  selected  from  the  general
student  population,  do  better  in  a public  or  private  school? In the  absence
of experimental  data,  it is  possible  to  obtain  a  reliable  answer  from  a
cross-section  comparison  of the  performance  of  public  and  private  school
students  on standardized  tests  --  if  we control  for  student  background,
motivation  and innate  ability.
In  the  Dominican  Republic  there  are  two  main types  of  private
schools:  those  authorized  by the  Ministry  of  Education  to  give  examinations
without  the  supervision  of a public  high  school  (F-type  schools)  and  those  not
authorized  to give  such  examinations  unless  so supervised  (0-type  schools).
Although  both  F-type  and  0-type  private  schools  must  register  with the
Ministry  of Education  and  meet the  same  requirements  for  facilities,  personnel
and  curriculum,  there  are  other  differences  between  them. The  F-type  private
schools  are  generally  regarded  as higher  status,  and  are  generally  more
expensive;  most (77%)  have a  religious  affiliation.  By  comparison,  only  31%
of the  0-type  private  schools  have a  religious  affiliation.
A standard  method  for  estimating  the  effects  of school  type  on
achievement  is to  postulate  the  following  reduced  form  model--the  "ith"
student's  achievement  score  (A)  in the  three  types  of schools  as a function  of
observed  background  variables  (X)  and  unobserved  variables  (e):I
I/  Alternatively,  equations  (la-c)  can  be estimated  as one  equation,  with a
dummy  variable  for  private  and  public  types  of schools.  However,  statistical
(F-)  tests  lead  us to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  of  all  the
other  variables  are  equivalent  in  different  types  of schools. The  results  are
available  from  the  authors.-4-
(la)  A  -bt Xif  + eio
(lb)  Ab  b;Kb  + el
(lc)  A4 - b  X  +  e.
If the  effects  attributable  to the  unobserved  variables,  e, are  randomly  and
normally  distributed,  ordinary  least  squares  regression  techniques  can  be used
to estimate  the  parameters  of the  equations  (la-c). Private/public
comparisons  can  then  be made  using  this  information.  For  example,  for  a
student  with the  characteristics  of the  average  public  school  student,  the
difference  in the  achievement  score  if  he/she  were  to attend  an F-type  private
school  would  be 2
(2)  Effect  - (bf  - b3) Xs.
A critical  problem  arises  if the  observed  public  and  private
subsamples  are  basically  incomparable  because  of  selection  bias.  This
situation  would  arise  if  students  from  a certain  background  systematically
2/ This  conclusion  can  be shown  easily. Subtract  the  estimated  equation  (lb)
from (la). Then,  add  and  subtract  bfX on the  right-hand  side  of the
resulting  equation. The  resulting  difference  can  be expressed  as:
Difference  - bt  (X 1 - Xg) +  (bt  - ba)  Xg
where  the  first  term  is  interpreted  as  the  endowment  effect  (i.e.,  the
difference  in  scores  attributable  to the  differences  in  characteristics)  and
the  second  term  is the  school  effect  shown  in equation  (2)  above.- 5  -
chose  one  type  of school  over  anorher. For  example,  if  privileged  students
chose  only  private  schools,  no  privileged  students  would  be enrolled  in  public
schools. Thus,  it  might  be misleeling  to  use  equation  (lc)  to infer  how
privileged  private  school  students  would  do in  public  schools. Statistically,
this  situation  means  that  the  error  terms  e  are  no longer  normally
distributed,  and  OLS  should  not  be used  to  estimate  the  above  equations.
To correct  for  sample  selection  when  parents  choose  among  the  three
alternatives,  we use  a  variant  of  Heckman's  two-step  technique.  The  first
step  in  this  methodology  is  to estimate  what  determines  the  choice  o' type  of
school. We assume  that  schools  are  ranked  by status  in  the  following
descending  order: F-type,  0-type  and  public. Individuals  will  choose  an
educational  plan,  including  the  type  of school,  that  will  maximize  the  child's
economic  well-being,  net  of private  costs. The  solution  to this  bias  problem
is  the  following  choice  equation  for  the  "ith"  child  (Cox  and  Jimenez  1987):
(4)  I* - k  Y,  + wi,
where  I* is an  unobserved  variable  that  characterizes  the  propensity  of  a
household  to choose  a certain  type  of school. Since  it is  unobserved,  we  use
the  indicator  variable
II  - 2  if  Ii*  >  c
If  - 1  if  o < Il*  < c,  and
If  - 0  if Ii*  <  o,- 6-
where  o and  c are  unobserved  cutoff  points  for  status  (2  - F-type,  1  - 0-
type,
o  - public),  Y indicates  the  explanatory  variables,  and  w is a  random  error
term. Under  suitable  assumptions,I'  equation  (4)  can  be estimated  as an
ordered  probit  model.
The  second  step  is  to  use  the  results  of the  first  step  to  correct
for  the  selection  bias in (3a)  and  (3c). With  selection,  the  expected  values
of  Al  are  conditional  on the  choice  of  public  and  private  sector. That is,
the  error  terms  el  are  correlated  with  w 1. The  expected  value  of el  will  no
longer  be equal  to zero  and  the  estimated  parameters  in (la-b)  will  suffer
from  an omitted  variable  bias  if  OLS  is applied. Under  appropriate
distributional  assumptions,/  the  first  step  probit  equation  can  be used  to
generate  selection  terms. Including  thos..  terms  in the  expanded  regressions
equations  (la-c)  enables  us to treat  the  selection  bias  as an  omitted
variables  problem. The  selection  terms  (called  lambdas,  by convention)  times
their  OLS  coefficients  can  then  be interpreted  as the  direction  and  magnitude
of the  selection  bias in  each  of the  public  and  private  school  achievement
equations. The  estimation  of (la-c)  with  the  inclusion  of the  lambda  by OLS
is  consistent  (unbiased)  because,  in theory,  the  equations  hold  constant  for
the  probability  of  being  selected  in  one  subsample  or another.
'  Details  are  available  from  the  authors.
41  Details  are  available  from  the  authors.-7-
THE  DATA
The Sample
Since  both  types  of private  schools  in the  sample  are  located
exclusively  in  urban  areas,  we compare  them  to  urban  public  schools  only.
This  paper  analyzes  data  from  2,472  students  in 76  schools  out  of the  national
sample  of students  and  schools  included  in  the  1982-83  study  of mathematics
achievement  in the  Dominican  Republic  (Luna  and  Gonzalez  198E). The  sampling
frame  for  the  original  study  stratified  schools  by type (three  types  of  public
schools  and  two  types  of  private  schools)  and  by location  (five  types  of  urban
and  three  types  of rural  settings);  a random  sample  of schools  from  each  cell
in the  frame  was drawn,  and,  within  each  school,  one  or  two  classrooms  were
sampled.
At both  the  beginning  and  end  of the  school  year,  students  were
administered  an  IEA  mathematics  test  and  completed  detailed  background
questionnaires.  Teachers  completed  several  instruments  at  the  pretest,  the
posttest  and  during  the  school  year,  including  a  background  questionnaire  and
a general  classroom  process  questionnaire,  and  provided  information  about
teaching  practices  and  the  characteristics  of their  randomly  selected  "target"
class. A school  administrator  provided  data  about  the  school  at the  time  of
the  original  data  collection;  we obtained  additional  data  on costs  and
enrollment  in conjunction  with the  preparation  of this  paper.8-
Degendent  Variables
A mathematics  test  similar  to that  developed  by IEA,  covering
arithmetic,  algebra,  geometry,  statistics  and  measurement,  was administered  to
students  at the  beginning  (pretest)  and  end  (poattest)  of the  scho.ol  year.
All students  were  administered  a  'core"  test  of  40 items  (27  items  from  the
IEA  core  test  and  13 other  IEA  items)  and  one  of four  "rotated"  tests. This
paper  analyzes  data  from  the  core  test.
Indegendent  Variables
The  indepencent  variables  analyzed  in  this  paper  include  fixed
student  socioeconomic  background  variables,  characteristics  of  students  that
changed  over  the  course  of the  year,  school  characteristics,  teacher
characteristics  and  practices,  and  peer  characteristics.
Fixed  Student  Characteristics.  The  basic  background  information
about  each  student  included:  gender;  age  in  months;  type  of  material  used  in
the  construction  of the  student's  residence,  an indicator  of socioeconomic
status  ([a)  block,  brick  or cement  or [b]  other  e.g.,  mud  brick);  highest
maternal  education  (years  completed);  maternal  occupation  ([a]  full-time
worker  or [b]  part-time  or  not  employed  outside  the  home);  and  paternal
occupation  ([a]  white-collar,  [b]  blue-collar,  [c]  agricultural  or
[d]  unclassified;  in  the  analyses  used i.  this  paper,  'blue-collar"  serves  as
the  comparator  group). The  actual  data  set  included  a wide  variety  of
variables  related  to  the  social  class  background  of students,  but  the  analyses
revealed  considerable  collinearity  among  them. Therefore  we chose  those  that
provided  the  greatest  information  without  excessive  collinearity.-9-
Chanfing  Student  CharacterIstics.  Two  variables  were identified
that  could  affect  achitvement  but  had little  effect  on the  choice  of  public  or
private  schools. The  first  was  commuting  time,  or the  length  of time  it took
a student  to reach  school  (ta]  less  than  15  minutes,  (bh  about  30  minutes,  [c]
more  that,  45  minutes  or (d]  no response). The  second  was  days  absent  in  the
past  month ((a]  never  absent,  lb]  less  than  3  days  absent,  [cl  less  than  5
days  absent,  [d)  5  or  more  days  absent  and (el  no response).
achool  Characteristics.  Four  school  characteristics  were  examined:
type  of school,  ([a]  F-type  private  schools,  authorized  to  administer  national
examinations,  [bJ  0-type  private  schools,  not  authorized  to  administer
examinations,  and [cl  public  schools);  student/teacher  ratio;  average  tuition
of  F-type  schools  in  the  region  in  which  the  school  was located;  and average
tuition  of 0-type  schools  in the  region  in  which  the  school  was  located.
TeaIher  and  Classroom  Characteristics.  Three  teacher
characteristics  were  analyzed: teacher  education,  or the  number  of years  of
formal  education  attained  by the  teacher;  teacher  experience,  or the  number  of
years  teaching  either  grade  eight  or the  second  year  at the  middle  level  of
the  Reformed  Program;  and  the  total  number  of  class  periods  per  week the
teacher  spent  teaching  ar another  school  (an  indicator  of teacher
involvement).  Two teaching  practices  were analyzed:  the  amount  of time,  in
minutes,  spent  on routine  administration,  and  the  amount  of time,  in  minutes,
spent  establishing  and  maintaining  class  order  and  getting  students'  attention
during  teaching  periods. Two  classroom  quality  variables  were also  included:
the  length  of the  mathematics  period,  in  minutes,  and  the  percentage  of
students  who  had  mathematics  textbooks.- 10  -
P-er  Characteristics.  Peer  group  characteristics  were indicated  by
four  class  averages:  pretest  score;  average  years  of  maternal  education:
proportion  of students  having  fathers  with  white-collar  occupations;  and
percentage  of students  who  were  female.
Comnarison  of  School Wyaes
Table  1 presents  the  means  and  standard  deviations  of the  variables
related  to student  characteristics  by type  of  school. Students  in  both  types
of  private  schools  in the  Dominican  Republic  came  from  distinctly  more
advantaged  backgrounds  than  did  their  public  school  counterparts.  This
finding  is  not  surprising  given  that  private  schools  charge  fees  and  public
schools  do not.  On  average,  the  private  school  students  had  more  educated
mothers,  were  more  likely  to  have a father  in  a  white-collar  occupation,  and
were  more likely  to live  in  a "blockn  house  than  were  the  students  attending
urban  public  schools.
Table  2 presents  the  means  and  standard  deviations  of the  school
variables  by type  of school. There  were differences  among  the  types  of
schools,  but they  were  not  consistently  correlated  with  the  status  of the
school. Private  F-type  schools  appeared  to  be the  most  advantaged,  with the
most  educated  and  experienced  teachers,  the  highest  proportion  of students
with textbooks,  and  the  longest  average  periods  of ir.struction.  However,
teachers  in  F-type  schools  also  spent  more  time  establishing  order  in their
classrooms,  on indication  that  they  spent  less  time  on instruction;  they  were
also  more  likely  to teach  additional  classes  in  other  schools,  a pattern  that
suggests  they  needed  to supplement  their  salaries.- 11  -
Table  1:  Mean Student  Characteristics  by Type  of School
(Standard  Deviation  in  parentheses)
School  TYDe
Variable  Public  Private-0  Private-F
(N-1,619)  (N-402)  (N-453)
Student  posttest  score  10.26  11.25  14.34
( 3.46)  (  3.86)  (  6.16)
Student  pretest  score  8.39  9.39  11.81
(  3.17)  (  3.18)  (  5.20)
Mother's  education  in  years  6.26  8.06  11.15
(  3.92)  (  3.90)  (  4.19)
Student's  age in  months  183.66  174.56  164.16
(22.18)  (19.61)  (13.39)
Residence  built  of cement  0.51  0.69  0.85
blocks  or  brick  (0.50)  (  0.46)  (  0.36)
Female  0.58  0.55  0.55
(  0.49)  (  0.50)  (  0.50)
Full-time  working  mother  0.16  0.24  0.31
(  0.37)  (  0.43)  (  0.46)
Father's  occupation
White-collar  0.29  0.49  0.73
(  0.46)  (  0.50)  (  0.41;)
Blue-collar  0.40  0.33  0.11
(  0.49)  (  0.41)  (  0.31)
Agriculture  worker  0.22  0.08  0.10
(  0.42)  (  0.26)  (  0.30)
Unclassified  0.08  0.10  0.06
(  0.27)  (  0.30)  (  0.23)
Student  commutes  to school
Less than  15  minutes  0.63  0.73  0.73
(  0.48)  (  0.44)  (  0.45)
About  30  minutes  0.28  0.22  0.22
(  0.45)  (  0.42)  (  0.42)
More than  45  minutes  0.09  0.04  0.04
(  0.29)  (  0.20)  (  0.20)
No response  0.01  0.00  0.01
(  0.09)  (  0.05)  (  0.09)
Days  absent  from  school  last  month
Never  0.57  0.60  0.61
(  0.50)  (  0.49)  (  0.49)
Fewer  than  3  days  0.27  0.25  0.27
(  0.44)  (  0.43)  (  0.44)
Fewer  than  5  days  0.08  0.08  0.06
(  0.28)  (  0.27)  (  0.23)
More than  5  days  0.07  0.07  0.06
(  0.25)  (  0.25)  (  0.24)
No response  0.01  0.01  0.01
(  0.11)  (  0.11)  (  0.08)- 12  -
Table  2:  Meen School  and  Peer  Group  Characteristics
(Standard  Deviation  in  parentheses)
School  Type
Variable  Public  Private-0  Private-F
(N-1,619)  (N-402)  (N-453)
Teacher's  education  13.70  13.01  14.01
in  years  (  1.64)  (  1.00)  (  1.64)
Teacher's/grade  8  mathematics  6.49  4.36  10.47
experience  in  years  (  5.01)  (  4.72)  (  5.84)
Number  of  class  periods  6.20  10.87  13.83
taught  elsewhere  (  9.66)  ( 9.99)  (11.68)
Length  of  mathematics  period  43.80  43.09  45.30
in  minutes  (  4.13)  ( 2.97)  (  5.19)
Minutes  spent  on routine  22.54  19.41  21.79
administration  (14.47)  (15.19)  (12.82)
Minutes  spent  establishing  19.20  7.12  23.07
order  in the  class  (17.98)  (  8.61)  (17.27)
Percentage  of students  with  17.50  55.97  62.75
textbook  (23.06)  (38.57)  (43.67)
Student/teacher  ratio  31.03  30.78  30.60
(  9.01)  (  9.04)  (16.44)
Class  average  pretest  score  8.27  9.35  11.84
(  1.15)  (  0.88)  (  3.61)
Class  average  mother's  6.23  8.11  11.22
education  in  years  (  1.25)  (  1.35)  (  1.92)
Proportion  of students
having  fathers  with  0.28  0.46  0.69
white-collar  occupation  (  0.10)  (  0.16)  (  0.20)
Percentage  of female  students  42.74  35.24  42.52
in  class  (  8.25)  (10.87)  (  9.82)- 13  -
The  differences  between  the  private  0-type  and  public  schools  were
irregular.  The  public  schools  had  more  educated  and  experienced  teachers  than
did  the  private  0-type  schools,  and  their  teachers  were less  likely  to  seek
additional  employment.  However,  the  private  0-type  schools  had  a  higher
proportion  of students  with  textbooks,  and  teachers  in  the  0-type  schools
spent  less  time  establishing  order  or  on administration.  There  were  virtually
no differences  in the  mean  teacher/student  ratios  or in the  average  duration
of a  class  period.
THE  EFFECT  OF BACKGROUND  ON  ACHIEVEMENT  IN
PUBLIC  AND  PRIVATE  SCHOOLS
According  to  Table  1,  the  average  posttest  scores  of the  students  in
the  private  0-type  schools  was  one  point  (about  10%)  greater  than  the  average
for  students  in the  public  schools  for  an effect  size  of .29;  the  average
score  for  private  F-type  students  was  over  four  points  (about  40%)  greater,
for  an  effect  size  of 1.18. The  gain  in  learning  over  the  eighth  grade,  as
measured  by the  difference  between  the  pre-  and  posttest  scores,  was  virtually
the  same  in the  public  and  0-type  schools:  1.87  points,  or one-half  of a
standard  deviation. However,  the  gain  by the  F-type  students  --  2.53  points  -
- was .66  points  (three-fourths  of  a  standard  deviation)  greater  than  the  gain
by the  public  school  students.
Because  the  students  in the  public  schools  differed  from  those  in
both types  of private  schools,  these  gross  differences  in  achievement  should- 14 -
not  be used  to conclude  that  one  type  of school  was  more  or  less  effective
than  the  other. The  previous  comparisons  between  students  in  the  three  types
of schools  (Table  1)  showed  that  private  school  students--particularly  those
attending  F-type  schools--came  from  more  advantaged  backgrounds  as  compared
with  public  school  students. They  had  more  educated  mothers,  lived  in  better
houses,  tended  to  have  a full-time  working  mother,  and  had fathers  with  white-
collar  occupations.  Since  both  types  of  private  schools  charged  tuition  and
the  public  schools  did  not, these  differences  in  socioeconomic  status  are  not
surprising.
Much research  indicates  that  background  variables  are  positively
correlated  with level  of achievement.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to adjust  for
differences  in student  background,  although  that  correction  is  not in itself
sufficient.  If the  impact  of  background  on achievement  increases  or  remains
constant  over  time,  then  correcting  for  background  would  tend  to lessen  the
private  school  advantage  in terms  of  gain  over  the  eighth  grade. Only  if the
impact  of  background  diminishes  over  time  would  correcting  for  background
strengthen  the  private  school  advantage. In  either  case,  it is  necessary  to
correct  for  differences  in  the  sample  selection  as well.
As mentioned,  we use  an adaptation  of a now-standard  two-step
methodology  to correct  for  background  variables  in  an  unbiased  way (see
Heckman  1979  for  the  original  article  and  Willis  and  Rosen  1979,  Lee  1979,
Jimenez  and  Kugler  1987,  and  Jimenez,  Lockheed  and  Wattanawaha  1988  for
applications  to  education).  The  first  step  is to  estimate  what determines  the
choice  of type  of school,  ranked  ordinally  in  order  of status:  F-type  private
schools,  0-type  private  schools  and  public  schools. We assume  that  parents- 15 -
and  students  choose  a school  whose  status  will  maximize  the  child's  lifetime
earnings,  net  of tuition. The second  step  uses  the  results  of the  first  step
to  correct  for  the  selection  bias in  the  achievement  equations. (The  details
of the  methodology  are  presented  in  the  appendix.) The  next two  subsections
discuss  the  results  of the  two  steps.
What  Determines  the  Choice  of School  TvDe?
The  resultp  of a regression  of the  choice  of school  type,  as
measured  by an ordinal  ranking  of  high (F-type),  middle  (0-type)  and  low
(public)  status  schools,  are  presented  in  Table  3.  Mother's  education,  the
quality  of the  student's  house  (a  proxy  for  wealth)  and  father's  occupation
(white-collar,  agricultural  and  unclassified  versus  blue-collar)  were  all
strongly  positively  correlated  with  choosing  a  higher  status  alternative.
Older  students  who  may  have  repeated  one  or  more  grades  tended  to choose  lower
status  schools. Neither  the  mother's  working  status  nor the  student's  gender
significantly  affected  the  choice  of school  type. The  other  group  of
variables  that  affect  school  type  is the  relative  cost  of attending  that
school. In this  analysis,  the  comparator  cost  is  that  of  public  schools,
whieh  do  not charge  any  tuition. For  each  observation,  the  cost  of  F- and  0-
type  schools  was  calculated  based  on  the  average  tuition  charged  by those
schools  in the  sample  stratum. While  we assume  there  is  no variation  in  the
cost  within  any  stratum,  we expect  considerable  variation  across  the  strata.
For  example,  the  schools  in  larger  urban  areas  probably  had  to  pay  teachers
higher  salaries  and  therefore  had to  charge  higher  tuition. Because  we do  not- 16 -
have data  on other  private  costs,  we assume  they  were.  while  si5nificant,
roughly  the  same  across  the  school  types.
Table  3:  Determinants  of Public,  Private  0-type  and
Private  F-type  School  Choice,  Dominic,an  Republic,  1982-83
Variables  Coefficient  Standard  Error
Intercept  -1.59**  0.62
Mother's  education  0.08***  0.01
Student's  age  -0.014***  0.001
Block  house  0.27***  0.06
Female  -0.03  0.06
Full-time  working  mother  0.01  0.07
Father's  occupation:
White-collar  0.57***  0.07
Agricultural  0.25**  0.09
Unclassified  0.20*  0.11
Average  tuition  of F-type  (1987-88)  -0.002**  0.001
Average  tuition  of 0-type  (1987-88)  0.02***  0.01
Lambda  0.68***  0.04
Log  likelihood  -1769.1
N  2474
Note: Dependent  variable:  public  school-0,  0-type  private  school-l,
F-type  private  school-2.
***  p <  .001,  **  p  <  .01,  *  p <  .05
The  coefficient  of  the  F-type  tuition  is  negative  and  significant,
as  we expected. When the  cost  of attendirg  an  F-type  school  rises  compared
with  public  schools  (holding  the  relative  cost  of  0-type  versus  public  schools
constant),  the  demand  for  status  falls. Students  will  then  switch  to lower
status  0-type  schools  or  public  schools.- 17
The  coefficient  of the  0-type  tuition  can  be positive  or negative.
When  the  cost  of attending  an  0-type  school  rises  compared  with  public  schools
(holding  the  relative  cost  of F-type  versus  public  schools  constant),  the
demand  for  0-type  schools  falls. This  displaced  demand  can  be met  by lower
status  public  schools  or  higher  status  F-type  schools. In  our sample,  the
displaced  demand  was  met  predominantly  by F-type  schools. Thus,  the
coefficient  of 0-type  tuition  is  positive.
What  Is the  Effect  of  Background  on  Achievement?
The  estimated  achievement  equations  for  the  private  F-type,  private
0-type  and  public  schools  are  presented  in  Table  4.  Because  standard  F-tests
reveal  that  the  differences  in the  coefficients  among  the  three  types  of
schools  are  significant,  we estimate  the  equations  separately.  The
explanatory  variables  include  the  background  variables  used in  the  equation
for  choice  of school  type  plus  some  variables  that  are  not  contemporaneous
with  school  choice. The  latter  include  the  pretest  score,  actual  commuting
time  to school  and  days  absent  from  school. The two  tuition  variables
included  in  the  school  choice  equation  --  average  prices  for  the  sample  strata
--  are  excluded  from  the  achievement  equations  because  they  should  have little
effect  on individual  performance  once  in  school. Moreover,  excluding  them
helps  in identification  of the  system.
The  coefficient  of the  pretest  score  can  be interpreted  as the
lagged  effect  of  previous  background  inputs  on  current-year  achievement.  This
effect  is twice  as large  for  the  high  prestige  F-type  schools  as for  either
the  private  0-type  or  public  schools.- 18 -
When father's  occupation  and  other  variables  are  held  constant,
mother's  education  is  negatively  related  to achievement.  This result  is
perhaps  attributable  to  the  fact  that  .more  highly  educated  mothers  were apt  to
work  part-time  and  were  less  available  at  home.  Girls  in the  private  F-type
schools  were  not  disadvantaged  relative  to  boys,  while  in the  public  and
private  0-type  schools  thuy  gained  sign:ficantly  less  than  did  the  boys.
Commuting  time  and  days  absent  have  little  impact  on achievement.
The selection  term  in  each  of  the  achievement  equations  is lambda
times  its  coefficient,  where  the  latter  is  the  ratio  of the  covariance  between
the  error  terms  in the  achievement  and  choice  equations  to the  standard  error
of the  choice  equation. If this  value  is  positive  and  significant,  then  the
estimated  expected  value  of achievement  will  be greater  because  of the
selection  effects. Thus,  correcting  for  selection  will  lower  the  expected
value  for  achievement.  The  converse  would  hold if  the  value  is  negative  and
significant.  If the  coefficient  of lambda  is  not  significantly  different  from
zero,  then  the  selection  effects  are  not  important.
In  our  sample,  the  selection  effects  are  positive  for  the  public
schools  and  negative  for  both  the  0-type  and  F-type  private  schools. This
result  is somewhat  surprising,  since  we initially  thought  that  the  background
advantage  of the  private  school  students  would  lead  to a  positive  selection
bias. However,  t'he  strong  price  effects  indicate  that,  by charging  tuition,
private  schools  were  depriving  themselves  of bright,  highly  motivated  but  poor
students  who selected  public  schools. This  effect  appears  to counterbalance
background  selection  effect.- 19  -
Tabie  4:  Results  of the  Achievement  Equation,
Holding  Student  Characteristics  Constant
School  Type
Variables  Public  private  0  Private  F
Intercept  10.50***  9.53***  10.10***
(  1.01)  (  2.11)  (  2.88)
Pretest  score  0.41***  0.38***  0.81***
(  0.03)  (  0.06)  (  0.04)
Mother's  education  -0.05  -0.20*  -0.14
(  0.03)  (  0.09)  (  0.09)
Age in  months  -0.02***  0.01  0.01
(  0.01)  (  0.02)  (  0.02)
Block  house  -0.04  -0.53  -1.03
(  0.19)  (  0.53)  (  0.65)
Female  -0.55***  -1.14***  0.22
'  0.16  (  0.32)  (  0.37)
Full-time  working  0.16  1.01*  -0.07
mother  (  0.22)  (  0.42)  (  0.43)
Father's  occupation
White-collar  -0.33  -1.13  -1.03
C  0.25)  (  0.66)  (  0.83)
Agricultural  -0.47*  -0.28  -0.43
(  0.21)  (  0.73)  (  0.79)
Unclassified  -0.35  -0.06  0.14
(  0.31)  (  0.66)  (  0.95)
Commuting  time
About  30  minutes  0.06  0.60  0.02
(  0.18)  (  0.41)  (  0.45)
More than  45 minutes  -0.51  -2.14*  -1.04
(  0.27)  (  0.88)  (  0.97)
No response  0.79  -2.19  2.19
(  0.93)  (  3.43)  (  2.09)
Days  absent
More than  5  0.02  0.22  -0.58
(  0.32)  (  0.72)  (  0.79)
Fewer  than  5  -0.36  -0.06  1.11
(  0.29)  (  0.64)  (  0.80)
Fewer  than  3  -0.01  0.53  -0.74
(  0.18)  (  0.41)  (  0.43)
No response  -2.46**  -0.76*  -2.27
(  0.77)  (  1.54)  (  2.32)
Lambda  -1.06  -2.52**  -3.86**
(  0.62)  (  0.94)  (  1.28)
N  1619  402  453
R2 0.21  0.23  0.60
Note:  The  numbers  are  the  regression  coefficients;  the  standard  errors  are  in
parentheses.
***p  <  .001,  **  p  <  .01,  p  <  .05.- 20 -
With  Background  Held  Constant.  What  I.  tbe  Private  School  Effect?
The  estimated  differential  in  the  achievement  of public  and  private
school  students  can  be computed  from  the  parameters  presented  in  Table  3, to
hold constant  the  effect  of  background.  Because  private  and  public  school
achievement  differs  in terms  of intercept  and  slope,  the  comparison  is
affected  by the  values  of other  explanatory  variables,  as  well  as the
coefficients  in  these  equations. Thus,  we compute  the  unconditional  private
school  effect  as follows:  from  the  entire  sample  of private  and  public  school
students,  consider  a randomly  chosen  pupil  with the  average  characteristics  of
a  public  school  student  (i.e.,  standardized  according  to the  public  school
means). The  unconditional  effect  measures  the  change  in  the  student's  test
scores  had that  student  gone  to  a private  school. The  same  calculation  can  be
performed  standardizing  at the  F-type  and  0-type  means  to test  the  robustness
of the  results,  which  are  presented  in  Table  5a.
Table  5a:  Private  School  Effects  on  Grade  8  Mathematics  Achievement,
Dominican  Republic,  1982-83,  Holding  Background
Characteristics  Constant  and  Controlling  for  Selection
Bias (Two-Stage  Correlation.)
Characteristics  of the  Randomly  Predicted  Score  Differgntial
Chosen  Student  Set  at  Mean  of:  Public  0-Type  F-Type  0-Pub.  F-Pub.
Public  school  subsample  9.79  12.86  17.26  3.08  7.47
Private  0-type  subsample  10.31  12.67  17.41  2.36  7.10
Private  F-type  subsample  11.29  12.54  18.36  1.26  7.07- 21 -
The  results  indicate  that,  with  past  achievement  and  socioeconomic
background  held  constant,  eighth  grade  students  in  the  private  schools  who
have  the  mean  characteristics  of a  public  school  student  have  an  unconditional
advantage  in test  performance  of about  3  points  in the  private  0-type  schools
and 7  points  in the  private  F-type  schools. These  results  are  largely
invariant  when computed  using  the  0-type  or  F-type  characteristics.
Had  we used the  biased  coefficients  of an OLS  (without  correcting
for  selection),  we would  have  come  up with  qualitatively  similar  results.
However,  the  magnitudes  would  have  been  different--only  about  a .3  point
advantage  for  the  private  0-type  schools  and  1-2  points  for  the  private  F-type
schools  (Table  5b).
Table  5b:  Pr..vate  School  Effects  on Grade  8  Mathematics  Achievement,
Dominican  Republic,  1982-83,  Holding  Background
Characteristics  Constant  and  Not  Controlling  for
Selection  Bias (OLS)
Characteristics  of the  Randomly  Predicted  score  Differential
Chosen  Student  Set  at  Mean  of:  Public  O-Tyq;e F-Type  O-Pub.  F-Pub.
Public  school  subsample  10.26  10.35  10.24  .09  -. 02
Private  0-type  subsample  10.99  11.25  11.66  .26  .67
Private  F-type  subsample  12.25  12.63  14.34  .38  2.10
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  PUBLIC-PRIVATE  DIFFERENTIAL
The  previous  section  showed  that  the  private  school  students  in the
Dominican  Republic  scored  higher  on  mathematics  achievement  tests  at the  end
of the  eighth  grade  than  did  their  public  school  counterparts,  after- 22 -
controlling  for  previous  achievement,  socioeconomic  background  and  systematic
selection  by  school  type.  The  effect  was  larger  for  the  higher  status  F-type
schools.  In  terms  of  policy,  the  important  question  is  why  this  difference
exists.  Is  it  possible  to  identify  the  characteristics  of  the  private  schools
that  most  contribute  the  achievement  effect?  What  do  administrators  and
teachers  do  that  is  different?  What  are  the  peer  group  effects?  These
questions  are  answered  in  the  next  two  subsections.
S;hool.  Classroom.  Teacher  and  Teaching  Practice  Variables
Table  2  showed  that  there  were  substantial  differences  in  the
school,  classroom,  teacher  qualification  and  practice  variables  among  the
various  types  of  schools.  These  differences  were  not,  however,  consistently
covmensurate  with  the  status  of  the  school  type.
Table  6  shows  the  results  of  adding  these  variables  to  the
achievement  equations  for  the  various  types  of  schools.  With  student
background  characteristics  held  constant,  few  of  the  school,  classroom  or
teaching  practice  variables  were  statistically  significant.  In  the  F-type
schools,  the  students  of  the  more  educated  teachers  scored  about  I  point
higher  than  did  the  students  of  less  well-educated  teachers  for  each
additional  year  of  teacher  education.  Further,  the  students  of  teachers  who
taught  elsewhere  scored  about  one-tenth  of  a  point  higher  for  each  additional
class  period  than  did  the  students  of  teachers  who  taught  fewer  class  periods
elsewhere.  The  remaining  teacher  and  teaching  practice  variables  had  no
effect  on  student  achievement.  In  the  0-type  schools,  no  teacher  or  teaching
variable  was  associdted  with  the  differences  in  achievement.  In  the  public- 23 -
Table  6:  Results  of the  Achievement  Equation  with
Student  and  School  Characteristics  Hold  Constant
School  Type
Variables  Public  Private  0  Private  F
Intercept  10.71***  7.08  -5.25
(1.81)  (4.98)  (7.19)
Pretest  score  0.41**  0.39***  0.71***
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.05)
Mother's  education  -0.05  -0.23  -0.10
(0.04)  (0.16)  (0.13)
Age in  months  -0.02**  0.02  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)
Block  house  -0.12  -0.63  -0.58
(0.19)  (0.69)  (0.78)
Female  -0.56**  -1.11**  0.22
(0.16)  (0.35)  (0.40)
Full-time  working  mother  0.19  1.07*  -0.19
(0.22)  (0.42)  (0.42)
Fath.er's  occupation
White-collar  -0.37  -1.34  -0.66
(0.27)  (1.10)  (1.06)
Agricultural  -0.40  -0.34  -0.13
(0.22)  (0.84)  (0.86)
Unclassified  -0.41  -0.17  0.50
(0.31)  (0.73)  (0.98)
Commuting  time
About  30  minutes  0.02  0.49  -0.14
(0.18)  (0.42)  (0.46)
More than  45 minutes  -0.53  -2.37**  -1.35
(0.27)  (0.89)  (0.94)
No response  0.77  -2.22  2.14
(0.93)  (3.43)  (2.03)
Days  absent
More  than  5  -0.01  0.40  -0.50
(0.32)  (0.72)  (0.78)- 24 -
(Table  6  continued)
School  TyMe
Variables  Public  Private  0  Private  F
Fewer  than  5  -0.38  0.02  0.87
(0.29)  (0.65)  (0.79)
Fewer  than  3  0.01  0.63  -0.56
(0.19)  (0.42)  (0.43)
No response  -2.47**  -0.84  -2.07
(0.77)  (1.55)  (2.29)
Student/teacher  ratio  -0.01  0.01  0.05
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)
Teacher's  experience  0.001  0.03  -0.06
in  years  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.06)
Teacher's  education  0.004  0.02  1.13***
in  years  (0.06)  (0.26)  (0.34)
Class  periods  0.03**  0.002  0.10**
taught  elsewhere  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)
Length  of  mathematics  -0.01  0.03  -0.03
period  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.06)
Minutes  on routine  -0.002  0.02  0.02
administration  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Minutes  on  -0.002  -0.05  -0.004
establishing  order  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)
Lambda  -1.22  -2.91  -2.25
(0.71)  (1.91)  (2.14)
N (students)  1619  402  453
Adjusted  R2 .20  .19  .60
Note:  Tne  numbers  are  regression  coefficients;  the  standard  errors  are in
parentheses.
***p < .001,  ** p  <  .01, * p < .05.- 25  -
schools,  only  the  number  of  class  periods  the  teacher  taught  elsewhere  had an
effect  on student  achievement,  and  the  effect  again  was  positive.
After  holding  these  variables  constant,  it  would  be expected  that
some  of the  private  school  advantage  would  disappear.  After  all,  these
differences  in teacher  characteristics  and  teaching  practices  may  account  for
a  portion  of that  advantage. The  results  in  Table  7  indicate  that  this
hypothesis  is indeed  the  case,  at least  for  the  F-type  schools:  the  private  F-
type  advantage  over  public  schools  falls  from  7  points  to about  4-5  points.
However,  it  does  not  disappear,  the  implication  being  that  there  are
unmeasured  practices,  teacher  characteristics  or  factors  that  motivate  teacher
performance  that  account  for  a residual  impact. For  the  private  0-type
schools,  holding  these  characteristics  constant  has  virtually  no impact  on
their  advantage  over  public  schools,  which  remains  at about  2-3  points.
Table  7: Private  School  Effects  After  Holding  Background,  Teacher,
and  School  Characteristics  Constant,  Dominican  Republic,  1982-83.
Characteristics  of the  Randomly  Predicted  Score  1Differential
Chosen  Student,  Set  at  Mean of:  Public  Private Private  0-Pub.  F-Pub.
0-Type  F-Type
Public  school  subsample  9.72  12.76  14.32  3.04  4.60
Private  0-type  subsample  10.34  12.90  14.59  2.56  4.25
Private  F-type  subsample  11.32  12.08  16.69  0.76  5.37
Peer  Group  Effects
Because  students  interact  with  each  other  in  school,  the  ability  and
backgrounds  of fellow  students  could  arfect  individual  achievement.  To26
account  for  this  possibility,  we add  to the  achievement  equations  three
classroom-level  peer  variables:  average  protest  score,  average  years  of
education  of students'  mothers,  and  proportion  of students  whose  fathers  are
white-collar. (Because  of collinearity,  these  variables  are  added  to those  in
Table  4; sehool  and  teacher  variables  are  no included.)  As shown  in  the
tables  of  means,  these  classroom  peer  characteristics  rise  with the  school's
status.
Table  8 shows  the  effect  on the  results  of adding  these  variables.
The  selection  terms  become  insignificant,  an indication  that  these  peer  group
variables  may  be capturing  their  effect. This  result  is  not  surprising  if
students  with similar  backgrounds  are  led  to select  schools  of similar  status.
(See  Murnane  1985  for  an earlier  discussion  of the  peer  group  effects.) Thus,
an important  methodological  result  is  that  adding  peer  group  variables  may
substitute  for  the  more  cumbersome  techniques  that  correct  for  selection  bias.
The  effect  of these  variables  on  the  private  school  effect  is
interesting  as  well.  According  to  Table  9, adding  the  peer  group  effects  to
the  achievement  equations  significantly  diminishes  the  private  school
advantage. This  result  was  found  earlier  for  Thailand,  using  similar  data
(Jimenez,  Lockheed  and  Wattanawaha  1987).- 27  -
Table  8:  Results  of  Achievement  Equation  with
Student  and  Peer  Group  Characteristics  Held  Constant
School  T_Ue
Variable  Public  Private  0  Private  F
Intercept  6.64***  2.45  6.46*
(1.25)  (3.30)  (3.26)
Pretest  0.36***  0.35***  0.67***
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.05)
Mother's  education  -0.03  -0.12  0.10
(0.03)  (0.09)  (0.11)
Age in  months  -0.01*  0.01  -0.04
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Block  house  -0.07  -0.16  -0.16
(0.19)  (0.54)  (0.69)
Female  -0.53**  -1.18***  0.03
(0.15)  (0.35)  (0.37)
Full-time  working  0.13  0.99*  -0.18
mother  (0.21)  (0.42)  (0.41)
Father's  occupation
White-collar  -0.27  -0.46  0.67
(0.25)  (0.71)  (0.95)
Agricultural  -0.18  0.12  0.37
(0.21)  (0.74)  (0.83)
Unclassified  -0.32  0.29  0.87
(0.30)  (0.68)  (0.98)
Commuting  time
Ab.ut  30  min.  -0.02  0.50  -0.30
(0.17)  (0.41)  (0.44)
More than  45  min.  -0.63*  -2.25*  -1.75
(0.27)  (0.87)  (0.93)
No response  0.77  -2.24  1.39
(0.91)  (3.40)  (2.01)- 28 -
Table  8 (cont.)
School  Tyte
Variable  Public  Private  0  Private  F
Days absent
More than  5  0.26  0.22  -0.62
(0.31)  (0.71)  (0.78)
Fewer  than  5  -0.31  0.13  0.87
(0.28)  (0.65)  (0.79)
Fewer  than  3  0.05  0.58  -0.55
(0.18)  (0.41)  (0.42)
No response  -2.31**  -0.85  -1.83
(0.75)  (1.53)  (2.29)
Class  average  0.45***  0.49  0.49***
pretest  score  (0.08)  (0.25)  (0.11)
Class  average  -0.12  0.20  -0.31
mother's  education  (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.20)
Proportion  of students
having  fathers  with  4.11***  0.14  2.41
white-collar  occs.  (0.96)  (1.55)  (1.71)
Percentage  of female  -0.01  0.01  -0.01
students  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Lambda  -0.49  -1.25  1.18
(0.64)  (1.03)  (1.68)
N (students)  1619  402  453
Adjusted  R2 0.23  0.20  0.61
Note:  The  numbers  are  regression  coefficients;  the  standard  errors  are  in
parentheses.
***  p < .001,  **  p < .01, *  p < .05.- 29  -
Table  9.  Private  School  Effects  after  Holding  Background  and  Peer
Group  Characteristics  Constant,  Dominican  Republic,  1982-83
Characteristics  of the  Randomly  Predicted  score  Dfeeta
Chosen  Student  Set  at  Nean of:  Public  Private  Private  0-Pub.  F-Pub.
0-Type  F-Type
Public  school  subsample  10.04  10.97  8.12  0.93  -1.92
Private  0-type  subsample  11.56  11.95  9.95  0.39  -1.60
Private  F-type  subsample  14.05  14.23  13.12  0.18  -0.93
RELATIVE COST OF PRIVATE  AhD PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Two questions  are  now  explored:  what is  the  relative  cost-
effectiveness  of the  three  types  of schools,  and  what is the  value  added  by
private  schools?
Our cost  data  are  admittedly  incomplete.  '"hen  the  information  on
school  background  was  originally  gathered  in  1982-83,  financial  material  was
not included. Although  we returned  to the  sample  schools  in 1987-88,  we  were
able to  obtain  only  very limited  information  on costs. Nevertheless,  the  data
on salaries  for  teaching  and  non-teaching  staff,  which  often  accounts  for  as
much  as 90-95%  of recurrent  costs  in  education,  do give  useful  indications.l
Two types  of evidence  are  presented  to  address  the  issue  of relative
cost-effectiveness.  One  relies  on  actual  but  partial  data  on  unit  costs,
i.e.,  salary  expenditures  per  student  among  the  schools  (Table  10). The  other
S' UNESCO  data  for  the  Dominican  Republic  show  that  teacher  emoluments
accounted  for  95%  of public  general  secondary  education  expenditures  in  1983.- 30 -
(Table  11)  compares  roughly  estimated  full  unit  costs  relative  to  predicted
mathematics  achievement  scores,  assuming  that  the  tuition  and  fees  reflected
the  long-run  average  cost  per  student  year  of  private  education. For  public
schools,  two  estimates  of the  average  cost  per  student  year  are  presented,
calculated  using  an  assumed  ratio  of  non-salary  to total  expenditures  to  take
into  account  capital  costs  (e.g.,  buildings,  library  and  equipment)  and  other
Table  10:  Comparative  Cost  Data  by Type  of School
Variable  Public  Private
0-Type  F-Type
Expenditure  per  student
Teacher  salaries  (RD$/month)  15.90  9.71  16.77
Non-teaching  staff  salaries  (RD$/month)  6.99  3.36  7.20
Total  22.89  13.07  23.97
Average  annual  salary
Teachers  (RD$/year)  444.30  237.10  447.80
Non-teaching  staff  (RD$/year)  421.50  309.40  728.00
Non-teacher  salaries  as %  of all  salaries  30.55  25.69  30.04
Tuition  and  fees (RD$/year)  None  209.20  472.40
Government  grant  per  student  (RD$/month)  - 0.80  0.72
expenses. In our  opinion  this  ratio  is  at least  15%. The  level  of
mathematics  achievement  used  to divide  the  average  cost  per  student  is the
predicted  posttest  score,  with  costs  and  background  characteristics  held- 31 -
constant  and  controlling  for  selection  bias.  For  this  analysis,  background
characteristics  are  set  equal  to their  mean  values  for  public  school  students.
Q-tyDe  Private  Schools. On  average,  0-type  private  schools  are  much
more  cost-effective  than  public  schools. That is,  their  per-student  salary
expenditures  are  43% lower  than  those  of the  public  schools,  but mathematics
achievement  is 31%  higher. This  conclusion,  which  is  confirmed  by the  data in
Table  11,  is  robust;  the  table  shows  that  the  ratio  of the  full  unit cost  to
predicted  mathematics  posttest  score  is lower  by at least  50.6%  at the  0-type
private  schools  as compared  with the  public  schools. Moreover,  the  advantage
of the  private  0-type  schools  over  the  public  schools  may  be underestimated
inasmuch  as our  cost  estimate  includes  economic  profit.
One  reasot  why the  private  0-type  schools  are  more  cost-effective
than  the  public  schools  is  that  they  hire teachers  at a lower  cost. The
average  expenditures  per teacher  at the  private  0-type  schools  are  close  to
47%  less  than  at the  public  schools. Another  reason  may  be that  the  private
schools  are  closed  less  often  for  public  holidays,  etc.
F-tyDe  Private  Schools. With  regard  to the  F-type  schools,  the
conclusions  are less  clearcut. However,  they  are  probably  more  cost-effective
than  the  public  schools. They  spend  4.7%  more  per student  than  the  public
schools  spend  on salaries,  but their  advantage  in terms  of the  predicted
cognitive  achievement  of  children  is  76.3%  more.  In  terms  of the  estimated
full  cost  per  predicted  mathematics  posttest  score  in  Table  11,  the  private  F-
type  schools  also  appear  to  be more  cost-effective  than  do the  public  schools.- 32  -
Table  11:  Cost  Per  Predicted  Points  on  Posttest  Mathematics  Test  and  Effect
Size,  by School  Type,  with  Background  Characteristics  Held Constant
and  Selection  Bias  Controlled  for
Predicted  Effect  Cost  per  Cost  per  Cost  per
Posttest  Size  b/  Student  t/  Point  on  Standard
Score  a/  Math  Test  Deviation
Unit
Public 15%  9.79  - 323  33.0
5  9.79  - 289  29.5  -
Private  0-type  12.86  .89  209  16.3  234.8
Private  F-type  17.26  2.16  472  27.4  218.5
*/ From  Table  5a.
b/  Effect  size  is defined  as the  difference  between  the  predicted  private
school  mathematics  score  and  the  predicted  public  school  mathematics  score
divided  by the  standard  deviation  of the  public  school  scores;  the  measure
is the  standard  deviation  unit.
d  Tuition  and  other  fees  reflect  the  long-run  average  cost  pe_  student  in
the  private  schools. For  the  public  schools,  the  following  formula  is
used:  C - X/(l - N) where  C  - cost  per  student,  X - salary  expenditure
per student  and  N - non-salary  cost  as  a proportion  of total  cost.
F-tyDe  Versus  0-tyne  Private  Schools. In  comparison  with  the
private  0-type  schools,  the  private  F-type  schools  have  a 70%  higher  cost  to
achievement  ratio. A major  reason  for  this  higher  ratio  is  much larger
expenditures  for  salaries;  private  F-type  schools  spend  83.5%  more  per  student
for  salaries  than  do the  private  0-type  schools. The  additional  cost  is
associated  with  mathematics  achievement  scores  that  are  34.2%  higher  at the- 33 -
F-type  private  schools  than  at the  0-type  private  schools,  other  things  being
equal.-,
The  apparent  advantage  of the  private  0-type  schools  over  the
private  F-type  schools  in  terms  of cost-effectiveness  is,  however,  dependent
on the  metric  of achievement.  When  the  costs  per  point  on the  mathematics
test  are  compared,  the  private  0-type  schools  appear  substantially  more  cost-
effective  than  do the  private  F-type  schools  (as  well  as more  cost-effective
than  the  public  schools). When  the  score  advantage  of both  types  of private
schools  is  converted  to  standard  deviation  units,  or effect  sizes,  the
comparative  advantage  of the  0-type  private  schools  is  reduced:  students  in
the  0-type  private  schools  score  less  than  one  standard  deviation  higher  than
do students  in  the  public  schools,  while  students  in the  F-type  private
schools  score  over  two  standard  deviations  higher. The  cost  per  standard
deviaZion  of achievement  in  both  types  of  private  schools  is roughly
equivalent.
We now  turn  to  the  next  question:  what  is the  value  added  of private
education? A fundamental  contribution  of  private  schooling  is filling  market
demand  not  satisfied  by the  public  education  system. Moreover,  from  the  point
of  view  of public  finance,  the  private  school  system  is  important  because  it
allows  children  to  have  a  higher  level  of learning  achievement  than  would  be
9/ It is intriguing  to  note,  however,  that  relative  to  the  F-type  schools,
parents  sending  their  children  to the  0-type  schools  are  paying  only  slightly
more  for  each  unit  of extra  learning  achievement  (gained  over  and  above  their
children's  predicted  scores  in  a  public  school  setting). In this  regard,
parents  sending  their  children  to the  0-type  schools  pay  RD$68. On the  other
hand,  those  with  children  in the  F-type  schools  pay  slightly  less  RD$63. This
finding  indicates  that  profits  are  higher  for  the  0-type  than  the  F-type
schools,  a situation  that  is  not  surprising  given  the  differences  in religious
affiliation.- 34  -
expected  from  a  public  school  without  adding  to the  financial  burden  of the
government.  As public  schools  are  normally  geared  to  the  average  child,
private  schools  in  a  pluralistic  society  offer  alternatives  for  parents  who
want  more for  their  children.
CONCLUSIONS
The  paper  uses data  from  the  Dominican  Republic  to extend  the
evidence  on the  relative  cost  and  effectiveness  of  public  and  private  schools.
It also  increases  our  understanding  of  how improvements  in effectiveness  and
economic  efficiency  are  being  achieved  by exploiting  the  opportunities
afforded  by several  unique  characteristics  of the  data  set --  unlike  in
previous  studies,  the  Dominican  Republic  survey  contains  information  on two
types  of  private  schools. Furthermore,  useful  (albeit  limited)  information  on
costs,  tuition  and  other  fees  were  obtained. This  information  enabled  us to
understand  the  market  for  education  a little  better  and  to confront  some  of
the  prevailing  myths  about  private  education  with  real  evidence.
Several  conclusions  are  worth  highlighting  here.  First,  selectivity
bias  is important,  and  failure  to  deal  with it  effectively  can  lead  to
misleading  conclusions.  For  example,  when  selection  bias is  not  controlled
for  the  estimates  suggest  the  effectiveness  of  private  schools  is  negligible.
Our  study,  however,  reveals  that  the  selectivity  bias  disappears  when  peer
group  characteristics  are included  in the  regression  equation. This  finding,
if generelized  to other  situations,  may  provide  a  credible  approach  to the- 35 -
problem  of selectivity  in  cases  where  it is  not  feasible  to  apply  the  Heckman
procedure.
Second,  when  non-school  factors  are  held  constant  and  sele3tivity
bias is  corrected  for,  the  conclusion  is that  students  on average  learn.  more
in  private  than  in  public  schools,  a finding  that  confirms  similar  findings
from  other  countries. The  learning  gains  in  both the  elite  F-type  private
schools  and  0-type  private  schools  are  considerable.  This  is  an interesting
result  in  that,  while  education  experts  are  reasonably  sure  about  the
effectiveness  of  elite  private  schools,  many  have  belittled  the  effectiveness
of so-called  low  quality  private  learning  institutions  such  as the  0-type
schools.
Third,  the  private  schools  are  more  cost-effective  than  the  public
schools. The  evidence  is  particularly  robust  for  the  0-type  schools:  compared
with  the  public  schools,  the  cost  per  unit  of  predicted  learning  is  lower  for
the  0-type  schools  by at least  50%  when  background  factors  are  held  constant
and  selection  bias is controlled  for. But  F-type  and  0-type  schools  are
equally  cost-effective.
The  findings  of this  study  underline  an  obvious  lesson  that  the
discussions  on education  have tended  to ignore  too  often:  be sure  not  to
compare  apples  and  oranges  when  comparing  schools. Elite  schools  may  be
expensive,  but they  may  also  be delivering  more;  cheap  private  schools  may  be
low  quality  but  parents  get  what  they  pay  for;  and,  finally,  public  schools
may  be free  privately  but  may  be costly  socially. Given  this  lesson,  we
strongly  suggest  that,  in the  future,  policy-oriented  comparative  research  on- 36 -
learning  achievement  should  be linked  with  data  on costs,  educational  fees,
socioeconomic  background  and  peer  group  characteristics.
The final  conclusion  to  be highlighted  involves  the  process  by which
private  schools  generate  value  added. The  results  here  show  that  the  private
school  business  generates  increased  economic  efficiency  by taking  advantage  of
market  demands  that  are  not satisfied  by the  public  school  system. Private
schools  target  particular  segments  of consumers  and  adopt  suitable  educational
approaches. In this  regard,  they  take  advantage  of the  peer  group  effects.
This  conclusion  is  especially  true  for  the  F-type  schools,  whose  learning
gains  over  public  schools  are  totally  dependent  on those  effects. The
relative  cost-effectiveness  advantage  of the  0-type  schools,  on the  other
hand,  is  only  partially  dependent  on them.- 37  -
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Appendix
The  probability  density  functions  for  each  of the  options  are:
(Al) Pr (Ii  - 2)  - Pr (c  <  kY 1 +  w 1)  - O((kY 1 - c)/a,]
(A2) Pr (Ii  - 1)  - Pr (o  <  kY 1 +  wi < c)  - [(c  kY1)/a] - 0[-  kY 1/aj
(A3) Pr (II  - 0) - Pr (kY 1 +  w,  <  0) - 1 - §[kY/ovj.
If the  [.1's  are  standard  normal  c.d.f.'s,  the  system  (Al)  to (A3)  is
an ordered  probit  model  which  can  be estimated  by maximum  likelihood.  This  is
the  first  step  in  the  estimation  procedure.
The  second  step  can  be derived  by observing  that  the  expected  value  of
achievement  is:
(A4) E(Air)  - bt  XW + E(ei  II,  - 2)
(A5) E(Ab)  - bo  Xio  + E  (ehi  - 1)
(A6) E(A 1) - beX + E(ejSII  - 0).
The  OLS  model  assumes  that  the  last  terms  in (A4)  - (A6)  are  equal  to zero,
since  a  r.rmal  distribution  is  assumed. When  the  distribution  is  truncated
normal,  th'ie  is  not  the  case. However,  if  we assume  that  the (eviwi),  j  -
f,o,g,  are  jointly  distributed  with  mean  zero,  we can  use  OLS on (A4)  to (A6)
with the  addition  of an appropriate  selection  term. This  can  be seen  by
manipulating  the  last  terms:
(A7) E(efflIl  - 2)  - E(ef  Iwi  > c - kY 1)
- oat  (oc  - kY 1)/[l  - (c - kY)]) - OfrA.
(AS) E(bI 1 I  I  1)  E (eig  - kY 1 < w1 < c - kY 1)
- ao ([,  -kYI)  - [(c  IkY)]/[0(c  *  kY 1) - *(-  kY 1)])
- °0w  AG,
(A9) E(egII 1 - 0)  - E(e,g1w  < - kI)
- - ogw  (O(-  kYj/O(-  kY 1)w  - - o
where  oa, j  - f,o,g,  is  the  correlation  coefficient  between  wi  and  the  error
term  of(the  achievement  equation  and  the  lambdas  are  (Mills)  ratios  of the
originate  of the  steadard  normal  at I to the  probability  of  being  in  the
sample. These  ratio;  are  computed  from  the  first  stage  probit  equation.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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